[Originally published on marxist.com]
Johannes Halter, RCI Brazil
22 September 2025
Brazil faces its greatest external aggression since the 1964 coup. The same imperialist tormentor that orchestrated and encouraged the military dictatorship, the United States, is now imposing a protectionist policy of 50 percent tariffs on the Brazilian economy. Trump’s stated objectives are the release of former President Jair Bolsonaro, who longs for a military dictatorship, and the supposed ‘correction of mistreatment’ of American technology companies.
In reality, this trade war has the practical effect of being a trade blockade between Brazil and the US. Furthermore, Trump’s actions are an act of imperialist political aggression aimed at interfering in Brazilian judicial decisions and the country’s political scene.
This time, however, Brazil has so far managed to resist the pressure. This is due to a kind of room for manoeuvre made possible by the inter-imperialist dispute between the US and China that has been taking place in our country. Faced with this situation, the Brazilian working class cannot align itself with either American or Chinese imperialism. Both seek to exploit our territory, our wealth, and our labour force. It is up to workers and young people to adopt a policy of class independence and build the forces of communism necessary to overcome the current national crisis.
From 1964 to 2025
The 1964 coup had the effect, by interrupting João Goulart’s mandate and repressing the masses who were mobilising, of putting an end to any nationalist pretensions for Brazil and opening up the country to US business and exploitation in the first place. The transition of regimes that pardoned tortured people and torturers, their agents and supporters, expressed in the 1979 Amnesty Law, was completed with that of the 1988 Constitution.
The new regime that emerged from this process, the New Republic, maintained the economic relations that had prevailed in the previous period. The bourgeoisie, subordinate to American imperialism, maintained its businesses, and the same external agents continued to exploit and intervene in Brazil under formally democratic regimes.
However, since 2013, we have seen the collapse of the social pact established by the Constituent Assembly that restored order after the fall of the military regime. The collapse of the New Republic was first expressed by the masses taking to the streets. This was followed by troubled presidential elections in 2014, the palace coup of 2016 that imposed Dilma’s impeachment, and the establishment of Temer’s government.
This was followed by the judicial scheme set up by Sérgio Moro, the arrest and exclusion of Lula from the electoral contest, and the consequent election of Bolsonaro in 2018. These social and political expressions also corresponded to an important change in the economic sphere: the arrival of Chinese capital in Brazil, displacing the financial dominance of the US over the country, which had reigned until then, and competing for space with the financial capital of the traditional imperialist countries.
The new US president now imposes, among all the tariffs he has imposed on other countries, the highest percentage in the world on Brazil. Such economic violence can only be compared to Trump’s tariff war against China in the first half of this year.
Unlike in 1964, however, the Americans are not concerned with any Brazilian nationalist pretensions. On the contrary, Brazil has been at the forefront not only in encouraging foreign capital to set up in the country, but also in promoting the privatisation of public companies and services, both those linked to industry and even services such as health and education.
Domestic and foreign debts have been paid religiously by government after government. Public debt exceeds 75 percent of GDP and repayment comprises almost 50 percent of the federal budget every year. It is a veritable drain on the nation’s resources, symbolic of its subordination to American imperialism, and chosen as the number one priority of Lula and Haddad’s economic policy. This is the policy expressed by the Fiscal Framework (i.e. government public spending cap).
Nor is it a fear of the mobilisation of the masses and a government inclined to serve them, as was the case with Jânio Quadros or João Goulart. Instead, Brazil is run by a government characterised by a policy of ‘national unity’, which means the subordination of the working class to the interests of the bourgeoisie. A government formed to save capital, its businesses and its established institutions, with Lula at its head, as a former trade unionist who keeps the working-class organisations under a certain control.
Thus, American aggression cannot be explained by a supposed national-developmentalist risk, or by a shift to the left on the part of the Lula government, or by the risk of a communist revolution that threatens the capitalist mode of production in the country.
Is the current trade war against Brazil the result of a decision by a madman sitting in the White House? If this is not the case, then what are the material forces that are driving the most powerful nation on the planet to launch itself against Brazil?
Documents released by the Revolutionary Communist International (RCI) have already analysed the global economic crisis facing the capitalist system, the difficulty capitalists have in maintaining profit rates as they did in the past, and the emergence of a new global political situation marked by Trump’s electoral victory. In this article, we want to advance our understanding of the nature, particularities, and development of this general situation within Brazil.
Trump’s target is another
We can approach the answer by first analysing the evolution of economic relations between Brazil and the US and Brazil and China over the last 20 years. Since 2009, China has become the main destination for Brazilian exports, leaving the US in second place. In the first half of 2025, exports to China totalled $47.68 billion, while exports to the US totalled $20.01 billion.
When it comes to imports, the list is also led by China. The cumulative total for the first half of 2025 was $35.69 billion. American products shipped to Brazil totalled $21.70 billion in the same period. Both in exports and imports by Brazil, the undisputed leaders are China and the US. Several figures can be listed to represent the same trend.
Let us now take a further step in understanding the concrete relationships represented by this trade balance data. What matters for our analysis is not the country a commodity came from, but the nationality of the bourgeoisie that owns the capital of the company that commercialised that commodity. It is to the nation that owns the capital that the profit obtained from the transaction will ultimately revert.
A portion of Brazil’s trade with China is controlled by American companies such as Apple, Dell, Microsoft, Intel, Nike, Ray-Ban, and Elon Musk’s Tesla. There are also other fractions controlled by capital from other imperialist bourgeoisies.
This data – and we would like to draw the reader’s attention to this – also include a movement of Chinese capital exports. After a long march towards capitalism, China has in recent years achieved the status of an imperialist nation that competes with old imperialist bourgeoisie, and has even surpassed several of them.
A massive amount of capital has been established in China, to such an extent that it is now facing the contradiction created by the limited consumption capacity of the masses in its domestic market. This situation requires Chinese companies to export capital to new markets where it can be applied more profitably.
Such a movement is precisely a striking feature of imperialist capital, as studied by Lenin. This type of capital is expressed by companies with majority Chinese capital such as ByteDance (TikTok), Xiaomi (smartphones), Shein (e-commerce), Lenovo (PCs), Huawei (telecommunications and electronics), AliExpress (e-commerce), OPPO (smartphones), Cherry (automobiles), BYD (electric vehicles), TP-Link (network devices), JAC (automobiles), and Midea (home appliances).
These are some of the Chinese-owned companies that produce consumer goods, mentioned because they also have production or operational units in Brazil. In other words, they are examples of Chinese capital already established in our territory.
It is thus evident that what Trump and the US are fighting against is both Chinese capital that arrives in the form of Brazilian imports, and Chinese capital that is already established or in the process of being established in Brazilian territory, and whose goods are directed to the domestic consumer market in Brazil and China itself.
Infrastructure and logistics
Let us now analyse Chinese capital investment in other economic areas, such as infrastructure in Brazil. As early as 2010, Sinopec (China Petrochemical) purchased a stake in oil exploration and refining assets. In 2013, Dilma auctioned off the exploration rights for the Libra Field for 35 years, with a single consortium submitting a bid, which was therefore awarded the contract.
Among the companies that made up this consortium, two were Chinese state-owned enterprises, CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation), accounting for 20 percent of the total.
In 2017, CMPort (China Merchants Port) purchased 90 percent of the Paranaguá Container Terminal (in Paraná), marking China’s entry into the Brazilian port and logistics sector. In the same year, State Grid (another Chinese company) took control of the CPFL energy distribution group in São Paulo, demonstrating China’s willingness to invest in the Brazilian electricity sector.
This had a significant impact on the Occupied Factories Movement. In 2018, it was CPFL’s new Chinese management that decided to stop negotiating with the workers at the Occupied Flaskô Factory and cut off the electricity supply to the factory in the interior of São Paulo. This episode culminated in the closure of the longest experiment in worker-controlled factory occupation in Brazil.
During that period, CTG (China Three Gorges) purchased generation assets and began operating large hydroelectric plants in Brazil. It was also in 2017 that the Chinese group HNA acquired a 60 percent stake to control Tom Jobim International Airport (in the city of Rio de Janeiro).
In February 2024, the Chinese group CRRC (China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation) won the auction promoted by the Governor of São Paulo, Tarcísio de Freitas, to build and operate the railway line connecting São Paulo to Campinas for 30 years. It was symbolic of the entry of Chinese capital into the railway sector in Brazil.
Also last year, the Chinese agribusiness group COFCO (China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation) began a major investment project in the Port of Santos (in the state of São Paulo). This plan includes a railway and road fleet for the transport of goods, with direct participation in logistics and export operations. COFCO is the largest Chinese state-owned agribusiness conglomerate. The initiative seeks to create exclusive export corridors to meet Chinese demand, reduce costs and risks, and consolidate China’s position as a direct player in the transport of Brazilian agri-food production.
Last July, CRRC signed a contract with the São Paulo Metro to supply 44 new trains for lines 1-Blue, 2-Green, and 3-Red. The amount offered by CRRC in the auction held on 27 December was R$ 3 billion. To fulfil these railway projects, the Chinese company CRRC agreed to manufacture the trains and other materials in the city of Araraquara (SP). To do so, it will take over the abandoned facilities of a Korean Hyundai factory.
This means that Trump’s current aggressive policy against Brazil is directed against a country where China already controls or is in the process of controlling significant portions of the logistics infrastructure. Ports, energy, and railways are not just lucrative businesses, they are also strategic corridors for the flow of goods and the redesign of global trade routes. By advancing in this sector, Beijing is undermining one of the pillars of American domination in Latin America: control of the transport and communication routes that connect Brazil to the world market.
Chinese imperialism in Santa Catarina
Chinese capital is also targeting Brazilian states such as Santa Catarina. Since 2016, negotiations have been underway for the construction of the Babitonga Grain Terminal in the city of São Francisco do Sul. The project was budgeted at R$1 billion, of which the aforementioned Chinese state-owned company COFCO has committed to contributing R$200 million. Another Chinese company, CCCC (China Communications Construction Company), has also expressed interest in participating.
The Santa Catarina state government itself announced that the Chinese group Hopeful has committed to making an initial investment of R$600 million in another initiative in the same city, the Santa Catarina Grain Terminal, dedicated to agricultural bulk goods. Negotiations are also underway with Chinese companies for the installation of the Porto Brasil Sul Terminal in the same city, which will be a multi-cargo facility.
The Chinese are also targeting Santa Catarina’s railway infrastructure, as can be seen in the negotiations for the acquisition of Rumo ALL. This concessionaire operates the railway network from São Paulo to the south. Therefore, it also operates in Santa Catarina and has access to the port of São Francisco do Sul.
Also in the railway sector, the government of Santa Catarina entered into negotiations in September 2023 with another Chinese company, CRCC (China Railway Construction Corporation). On the agenda were two railway projects. One is approximately 60 km long, covering a stretch between Araquari and Navegantes, which would connect Itajaí to the national network. The other project is 319 km of railways that would connect Chapecó to Correia Pinto, linking western Santa Catarina to the coast.
In June of this year, 2025, Governor Jorginho Mello visited China and, among other matters, discussed a partnership with the Chinese to develop regional aviation in the state, connecting the 24 airports in Santa Catarina. Part of this plan is the acquisition of Chinese aircraft produced at an aircraft factory in Harbin.
Jorginho’s itinerary also included a visit to the headquarters of the Chinese company CRRC (which has a presence in São Paulo), where he discussed the company’s plans to set up a unit in Brazil and sought to advance the projects quoted in 2023 for the construction of the Santa Catarina railway network. CRRC has committed to visiting Santa Catarina in the coming months to learn more about the project and advance talks with the government.
Another outcome of Jorginho’s visit to China was the negotiation with the state-owned company PowerChina for the installation of a large data centre in Santa Catarina. The city chosen will likely be Lages, which always appears in weather reports as having the lowest temperatures in Brazil, and even snow. This is because this type of climate is favourable for the venture, as it aims to support infrastructure for artificial intelligence and technological innovation.
In addition, 2024 saw the installation of the first unit of the Chinese company Eikto in the municipality of Laguna, Santa Catarina. Approximately R$20 million was invested in this unit, with an assembly line that manufactures lithium-ion batteries. In 2025, Eikto has already announced an expansion of its Laguna unit, bringing the total investment to R$114 million.
In July this year, FIESC (Federation of Industries of SC) received a delegation from the Chinese province of Shanxi, with which Santa Catarina began exchanges in 2015. The event discussed cooperation in the machinery, civil construction, steel, mining, and academic/technical sectors. At the end, a memorandum was signed formalising the intention to cooperate, an initial milestone.
So, the expansion of Chinese imperialist capital is now a reality in the state of Santa Catarina as well. And it manifests itself with its presence in sectors as diverse as ports, railways, aviation, technology, and energy. This is a regional confirmation of the national trend of its penetration into strategic points of the national economy. Its objective is clearly to seek profits, access to natural resources, and logistical control.
In the city of Joinville – the largest in Santa Catarina – since September 2023, the city council and a group of Chinese investors have been discussing the installation of a new industry in the city, given its logistical capacity and skilled workforce. Negotiations have progressed, and now the entry of Chinese capital into the city is a reality with the ongoing installation of a Chinese TP-Link factory in Perini Business Park, an important industrial park in the city.
The estimated investment for the operation is R$80 million, with the expectation of hiring 800 workers as early as 2025. The estimated revenue for this venture is around R$400 to R$450 million, which would correspond to about 1 percent of the municipal GDP.
Joinville already had some Chinese capital presence with Eklem Silicones, also located in Perini Business Park since 2016, when it left the city of Santo André, in the ABC region of the São Paulo metropolitan area. This company is a brand of the China National Bluestar Group. However, it is a small factory with around 50 employees, which had an initial investment of R$ 40 million.
Another presence that can be traced back to 2015 is Donper, a Chinese manufacturer of compressors for refrigeration systems and the third largest in the world in this segment (behind only Embraco and another Chinese company). Donper – linked to the Hubei Donper Electromechanical Group – established a technology development centre in Joinville, located on Rua XV de Novembro, with around 30 employees. The investment in this unit was around R$10 million and, to date, this centre has already generated at least 10 patents registered in the local operation.
A noteworthy case is that of Brazilian start-up Peixe Urbano. It was acquired in October 2014 by Chinese technology giant Baidu, often referred to as the ‘Chinese Google.’ After that, Peixe Urbano became part of Baidu’s ecosystem of products and services.
In January 2017, Peixe Urbano decided to move its headquarters from Rio de Janeiro to Florianópolis, with around 400 employees. They counted on a more favourable tax burden, greater Chinese interest in technology businesses in Santa Catarina, and the possibility of reducing costs with engineers and salaries, due to the lower cost of living.
The cases of Joinville and Florianópolis illustrate at a local level how Chinese imperialist capital penetrates the economy in a combination of different ways. It ranges from the direct installation of factories and technology and innovation centres, through to strategic acquisitions of national companies, to the incorporation of start-ups into its global ecosystem.
We are facing an offensive that tends to transform the productive profile of Brazilian cities, as well as subordinating the workforce and its innovation to the command of new foreign capital. What is presented to the masses as modernisation and economic dynamism means, in practice, the subordinate integration of Brazil into the international division of labour engineered by a new imperialist power.
Lula-Xi Jinping Agreements 1.0
Lula’s victory in the 2022 elections meant, among other things, a shift in the Brazilian state’s foreign policy towards China. With the Workers’ Party back at the helm of the federal government after a six-year hiatus, it resumed the policies that marked its first terms in office.
Relations with the so-called BRICS countries, as well as Mercosur (South American common market), have been re-established. This move towards closer ties, however, did not begin during Lula’s current term in office. In 2011, Dilma Rousseff made an official visit to China in her first year in office.
At that time, the aim was to expand the export agenda beyond soybeans and iron ore to include industrial and technological sectors. 22 agreements were signed, covering areas ranging from science and technology to cooperation in civil aviation. These steps deepened the trend of Chinese capital investment in strategic sectors in Brazil and consolidated China as the country’s main trading partner.
In April 2023, at the beginning of his current term, Lula made a four-day visit to China. Among the results of the Brazil-China Meeting, more than 40 agreements were signed, involving areas such as renewable energy, the automotive industry, agribusiness, green credit lines, information technology, health, tourism, and infrastructure.
Noteworthy projects include the partnership between Brazil’s Prumo Logística and China’s SPIC (State Power Investment Corporation) for renewable energy generation in the Port of Açu (RJ). Brazilian company Seara and Chinese company JAC Motors coordinated the acquisition of 280 electric trucks by JBS. Brazilian company Friboi and Chinese company WHC established a partnership for the distribution of products in the Chinese market. Friboi also agreed with Chinese company COSCO (China Ocean Shipping Company) to build five pulp ships and sign long-term transport contracts.
Vale signed eight agreements with various Chinese companies and institutions. These agreements cover low-carbon steelmaking, zero-emission motor graders, biochar, and green credit lines. Chinese giant ZTE and Brazilian company Unifique entered into a partnership to strengthen the 5G network in southern Brazil.
It was at that time, in February of that year, that an agreement was announced to carry out transactions between Brazil and China through a ‘pipeline’ for payments that did not involve the dollar. Another decision made at the 2023 Brazil-China Meeting was that ICBS Brasil would be the bank designated to coordinate this procedure, which promised to make transactions faster and cheaper.
The Bank of China reported in October of that year that it had carried out the first Brazil-China commercial transaction financed and settled in the Chinese currency Renminbi (RMB), with direct conversion to reais (without the dollar). In April 2024, China’s CGN obtained RMB 160 million in financing through ICBC Brasil to install modules and inverters for a solar power plant in Ceará. Since then, the Bank of China has been granting working capital loans in RMB to Brazilian and Chinese companies operating in Brazil.
The agreements signed by Lula in 2023 thus consolidated China’s position not only as Brazil’s main trading partner, but also as a strategic investor in key sectors of the national economy, deepening the country’s dependence on Chinese capital.
Lula-Xi Jinping Agreements 2.0
In May 2025, Lula made another visit to China. This time, 20 bilateral agreements were signed, covering up to 50 years. Among the investments are $1 billion for the production of an innovative aviation biofuel and the creation of a renewable energy research and development centre, a partnership between Senai CIMATEC and the Chinese giant Windey Energy Technology Group.
China also announced R$27 billion in investments in Brazil, covering the areas of infrastructure, technology, education, and professional training. Also planned are an MCTI-China Technology Transfer Centre, space cooperation with the China National Space Administration, and collaborative platforms in science, agriculture, and energy.
Among the technological projects, there are plans to build a virtual research and development centre for Artificial Intelligence, in a partnership between the Brazilian public company Dataprev and the Chinese company Huawei. A joint venture between Telebras and the Chinese company Spacesail will produce low-orbit satellites and expand internet coverage in remote areas.
In addition, technology transfer is planned for the production of vaccines, APIs, medical supplies, and equipment. Cooperation has also been agreed for the refining of rare minerals, electric batteries, and the valorisation of lithium, niobium, cobalt, copper, etc.
Another important project agreed between Brazil and China was the construction of the East-West Railway Corridor and bioceanic routes. Also called the Bioceanic Railway Project, it is an undertaking that aims to connect the Atlantic (in Brazil) and the Pacific (in Peru) within South America. This would mean a reduction of about 10,000 kilometres in the trade distance with China.
The railway project is expected to be about 4,400 km long, starting at the Port of Ilhéus (Bahia), crossing Goiás, Mato Grosso, Rondônia, Acre, and crossing the Andes to the coast of Peru. The final destination is the Super Port of Chancay, which is already open. The latter is a logistical hub of strategic importance in the Pacific, built with Chinese capital and now managed by China.
It is important to note that the Bioceanic Railway is still in the design phase. It is a very large project, which may never be fully realised. However, it clearly indicates China’s intention to reduce the time it takes to transport goods between Brazil and China. In addition, it seeks to create an alternative so that it no longer depends on the Panama Canal, which is now in dispute with the US.
Although not the direct purpose of Lula’s visit to China, BYD’s operations in Brazil are worth mentioning. In July 2023, the Chinese electric and hybrid vehicle giant announced the installation of its first factory in Brazil, in Camaçari, Bahia.
To this end, it took over the former Ford facilities, appropriating the existing production infrastructure left by the American company in 2021. The initial investment was R$3 billion, with the production of three models of electric cars and an annual capacity of 150,000 vehicles. BYD also announced plans to manufacture electric buses and lithium batteries in Brazil.
In 2025 alone, BYD intends to ship a total of 200,000 vehicles to Brazil. Brazilian manufacturers and unions have been pressuring the government to bring forward the increase in the export tax rate from 10 percent to 35 percent planned for 2026. It is also in 2026 that the company plans to have its factory in Camaçari fully operational.
It is also worth highlighting the role that Dilma has been playing at the helm of the NDB (BRICS Bank), based in Shanghai. Appointed by Lula, she took office in 2023 and will remain at the head of the institution until 2029, thanks to Russia’s support for her reappointment. Since the beginning of her tenure, the bank has approved 29 projects in Brazil, totalling $7 billion.
This new round of agreements between Brazil and China has deepened the country’s strategic dependence on Chinese imperialist capital under the guise of ‘technological cooperation’ and ‘sustainable development’.
The dragon in Latin America
This whole situation has left the American bourgeoisie increasingly alarmed by China’s growing influence in Brazil. This trend, however, can be observed not only in Brazil, but in virtually all of Latin America. China’s relationship with the continent is long-standing. At first, China only bought raw materials, which it continues to do.
However, the nature of this relationship has changed. Now the Chinese government encourages Chinese-owned companies to intervene in the region in sectors such as lithium, energy and electric cars. Of the 26 countries in the region, 24 are participating in at least one project connected to Chinese trade and the New Silk Road.
Politically, the Chinese have influenced the continent with the idea that the so-called ‘Global South’ must unite against ‘imperialism.’ Based on this, they are using their investments to put pressure on governments to open up their countries to China more and more. This has led to a situation where Latin America is the second-largest region for Chinese capital investment.
Chinese imperialists are also influencing the public debts of Latin American states through various loans. Chinese capital has played an important role in allowing states to roll over their debts by financing them. In recent years, China has become one of the main creditors in the region, accounting for about 20 percent of the external debt of some Latin American countries.
There are cases where China has surpassed traditional creditors such as the US and the IMF. In 2022, for example, more than 30 percent of the external debt of countries such as Argentina, Venezuela, and Bolivia was owed to Chinese creditors. These loans usually come from Chinese state-owned banks and extend China’s economic and political influence in Latin America via debt.
The entire recent history of Latin America, however, has been one of domination by the United States. Throughout this period, Uncle Sam has used various mechanisms and interventions to ensure that this situation continues. These means have included diplomatic pressure, the financing of entities that functioned as propaganda outlets, economic embargoes, the organisation and training of military and civilian officials, and even coups, including in Brazil in 1964.
The fact is that American capital and its political influence remain dominant in several countries in the region, such as Mexico and Central America. However, this is no longer the case in countries such as Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia. In these countries, trading partners have changed, with China taking the lead, and this has had political implications for each of these nations. In the case of Colombia, a transition is occurring: the US remains the main trading partner, but the country is increasingly seeking to rely on China.
Room for manoeuvre
This is the background that allows us to understand why Colombian President Gustavo Petro feels strong enough to openly oppose and challenge American imperialism. Colombia not only refused to accept American blackmail, but also entered into direct negotiations with China to circumvent US economic pressure.
Nevertheless, a sense of proportion is needed. The United States remains the most powerful country on the planet and therefore its most reactionary force. China is seeking to challenge the US’s position to become the main trading partner for Latin America as a whole. However, in terms of volume of capital invested and foreign capital flows, the Americans remain ahead of China, accounting, in 2024, for 38 percent of the value invested in Latin America and the Caribbean.
It is clear that the main and dominant imperialist power on the continent remains the US (and to a lesser extent, the Europeans). It is able to take advantage of its already established capital, geographical proximity, military presence, its close ties with armies in the region, etc. However, China is clearly trying to reassert its interests and access to markets, investment opportunities, sources of raw materials and energy, as well as trade routes.
Of course, the American imperialists are not going to give in and give up without a fight throughout Latin America. This can already be seen in what happened in Panama. All it took was a visit from a high-ranking American representative to pressure the Panamanian president, and Panama left China’s Silk Road project. Not satisfied, the US wants to regain direct control of the Panama Canal, a dispute that has yet to be resolved. However, they have already managed to place American troops in the area.
This new situation in Latin America, characterised by an inter-imperialist dispute between the US and China, should lead us to conclusions about what is happening on the continent. One of these is that it is leading to a very volatile situation in all countries.
Very dramatic and rapid changes will occur in the economy and in the lives of the masses in Latin America, which will have a strong influence on the consciousness of workers and will manifest in new waves of class struggle in the region. In this dispute, however, the working class and the oppressed can only count on their own strength. One cannot harbour any illusions in China.
Trump’s aggression
Trump’s aggression against Brazil through tariffs can be understood as yet another episode in American imperialism’s attempt to maintain its sphere of influence over Latin America against China’s growing interference. That said, it is necessary to understand what exactly Trump is pursuing as his objective in Brazil, and the real meaning of his actions.
Far from being crazy, Trump is first and foremost a legitimate representative of one of the most powerful sections of the bourgeoisie on the planet and an experienced negotiator for that class. Let’s follow in his footsteps.
Trump took office in the White House on 20 January. On the 24th of that month, a flight arrived in Manaus with 88 Brazilians deported from the US, many under escort, with cuffs on their wrists and ankles. The situation caused a great national commotion and diplomatic complaints. However, the message was clear. It was one of several humiliations inflicted by the emperor on his vassal, preceding other attacks aimed at subjecting Brazil to Washington’s dictates.
Another of these attacks occurred on 12 March, when the United States imposed a 25 percent tariff on all steel and aluminium imports from Brazil. On 2 April, designated by the US government as ‘Liberation Day,’ tariffs of 10 percent on Brazilian exports were announced, effective as of 5 April. The argument was that they needed to protect American industry.
According to Trump, Brazil had an unfair relationship with America, as the trade balance was unfavourable to the US. However, this alleged motivation was nothing more than fake news. A look at the data reveals that the Brazil-US trade relationship has been in surplus for the US for many years. In 2024 alone, there was a positive balance for the Americans of $7 billion in goods alone, and $28.6 billion including services.
Another factor behind the tariffs, as stated by the American president himself, was an attempt to retaliate against the BRICS countries and any attempt to undermine the position of the dollar in the global financial order.
This policy of economic nationalism, ‘America First,’ actually pursues several objectives simultaneously. One of them is to force American-owned companies to set up shop on American soil if they want to continue to have lucrative access to the largest consumer market on the planet… even if this is done at the cost of destroying all their investments in countries such as Mexico and Brazil.
Another of Trump’s objectives is to strike a blow against sectors of Brazilian industry that compete with American industry. In this way, he seeks to expand the markets of the latter, both in America and, in the medium term, in the Brazilian consumer market itself. For this reason, the list of 694 exemptions announced by the White House only includes products which the US does not produce or depends on Brazil to supply, such as orange juice.
The main objective of Trump’s tariffs, however, is to push Brazil into a crisis that will force the Lula government to negotiate favourable terms for the US at the expense of China. In other words, they sought to undermine China’s position in relation to Brazil and restrict its ability to invest and exploit the Brazilian market. This was also the meaning of the negotiations between the US and the European Union, which resulted in several measures against Chinese partnerships and investments.
New Silk Road
Contrary to Trump’s expectations, the Lula government’s response was to move closer to China, as expressed at the Brazil-China meeting in May this year, which we have already analysed in this article. In a way, Lula followed Petro’s example in Colombia by turning to China to counterbalance pressure from Washington. Furthermore, Brazil is seeking to deepen relations with the other countries that make up the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia) and relying on Mercosur, the South American common market.
Let us recall that on 21 December 2024, while still president-elect, Trump declared that the US should ‘regain control’ of the Panama Canal, claiming that exorbitant fees were being charged and accusing China of exerting influence over the canal’s management. On 20 January, during his inauguration speech, Trump claimed that the canal was “broken” and that China itself was operating it. In the following weeks, the Americans threatened economic action and even a military invasion to secure US access to the canal.
Under pressure, the Hong Kong-based Chinese company CK Hutchison Holdings, which operates ports at the entrances to the canal, opened negotiations with the consortium led by the American company BlackRock to sell its position. However, these negotiations were vetoed by China, which now demands the entry of the Chinese state-owned port operator COSCO into the agreement.
On 1 April, Panama and the US signed an agreement to position American troops near the canal, claiming that they would use the location for training and humanitarian purposes. Meanwhile, China has resorted to diplomacy at the UN and other international trade arbitration bodies to halt the sale of shares and reverse the effects of American pressure.
Let us now turn our attention to one of the items agreed upon at the Brazil-China meeting in May this year, the Bioceanic Railway Project, a continuous railway route from Brazil to Peru that would connect the Atlantic to the Pacific. Once completed, this project will be equivalent to another Panama Canal, but one totally under China’s influence. But more than that.
This initiative aims to facilitate the flow of Brazilian products (such as soybeans, corn, meat and ore) onto the Asian market. In addition, it seeks to reduce logistical costs and transport time. Finally, it aims to reduce dependence on long sea routes, such as the Panama Canal or the Cape of Good Hope.
Unlike the Panama Canal, the Bioceanic Railway Project would allow China to coordinate its investments in Brazil and throughout Latin America. This is also one of the meanings of the New Silk Road for the region.
This project would represent a weakening of American control over global trade routes, a reduction in its ability to hinder the development of its main rival in the world, and would further hamper its competitiveness on the continent.
A big stick against the weak
It is necessary to understand another striking element of the current political situation. A skilled negotiator, Trump is not willing to accept the first response from countries affected by his tariffs. On the contrary, he reacts to every move made by governments and exerts pressure where they are most vulnerable, using the enormous weight of the US in the global economy, with the aim of forcing them onto the terms that Trump desires. His main objective with his global trade war is clearly to halt China’s development by closing the doors of the markets that he considers America’s sphere of influence.
With this in mind, Brazil was selected by Trump as the most vulnerable and suitable adversary at the moment to indirectly, but harshly, target China. That is why he imposed the highest tariffs against any country, except for China itself. Brazil is vulnerable because, unlike India, for example, it does not exert a significant influence on the US economy. Furthermore, due to its geographical position and economic and political relations, Brazil does not have the capacity to directly ally with and favour American enemies, such as Russia, China and Iran.
It is a suitable target because it is the largest consumer market in Latin America and has been the destination, as we have seen, for increasingly massive amounts of Chinese capital. Brazil’s absolute subordination to American policy would be a severe blow to Chinese plans for the region and to China’s global dispute with the US.
These are reasons that allow us to go beyond abstract and impressionistic explanations of the political situation and enable us to understand concretely why the US decided to escalate the trade war against Brazil that began in March into an attempt to directly interfere in Brazil, starting on 9 July.
The Bolsonaro clan
The letter published by Trump addressed to Lula announced that tariffs on Brazilian products entering the US would increase to 50 percent from 1 August. In addition to the economic reasons already discussed, Trump’s arguments include the trial against Jair Bolsonaro, which he called an ‘international disgrace’. He ordered – like an emperor – that the ‘witch hunt’ conducted by the Supreme Court of an independent nation must end ‘immediately’.
This direct interference in Brazil seeks to influence the developing political situation. Trump aims to restore Jair Bolsonaro’s political rights, encourage Bolsonaro’s supporters to push for policies favourable to Washington, and enable a presidential candidacy that would be totally submissive to the US in next year’s elections.
Let us remember that, during Bolsonaro’s first term, the federal government expressed political and ideological alignment with the US. This was manifested by Bolsonaro’s intense pursuit of closer ties with Donald Trump on policies such as ‘anti-globalist’ and culture war issues, and through diplomatic alignment, including in international forums.
All this despite Brazil suffering from tariffs on its steel and aluminium (between 2018 and 2020) and restrictions on its access to new agricultural markets. At that time, in 2019, Brazil was granted non-NATO ally status, which facilitated military cooperation and the purchase of equipment. Bolsonaro, however, was slow to recognise Biden’s victory in 2021 and maintained a cold relationship with Trump’s successor.
Throughout this period, China was Brazil’s main trading partner, with Brazil mainly exporting soybeans, iron ore and meat, which resulted in billion-dollar trade surpluses. Despite this, members and allies of the Bolsonaro government were involved in several diplomatic disputes with Beijing, criticising China during the pandemic and making accusations about the origin of COVID-19.
Nevertheless, relations between Brazil and China remained normal in terms of trade, with no sanctions or restrictions. During this period, there was pressure from the US to exclude Huawei from Brazil’s 5G network. However, the 2021 auction of 5G licenses in Brazil ended up allowing indirect participation by companies linked to Huawei.
At the moment, however, Bolsonaro is not only ineligible to run for office due to his conviction but also faces several other legal proceedings and is already under house arrest. Several of his former allies are facing similar proceedings with the same aim: to use the judiciary to remove from the political scene those figures closest to Bolsonaro who threaten to disrupt the normal functioning of bourgeois institutions and the plans of the Brazilian bourgeoisie.
The Bolsonaro clan reacted to this. Senator Eduardo Bolsonaro, one of the targets of the ongoing legal proceedings, fled to the United States, where he began to coordinate a counterattack with American political figures and authorities. Trump’s new offensive against Brazil bears Eduardo’s clear fingerprints. It was intended to pressure Brazil into putting a regime favourable to Trump and hostile to China at the helm of the Brazilian government.
Whether Jair Bolsonaro or another figure who inherits his legacy ultimately heads this government is irrelevant to Trump, as long as their policy is one of subordination to American imperialism in the form of ‘America First,’ to the detriment of China.
Big tech
It is also necessary to thoroughly analyse Trump’s accusations that the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) has issued hundreds of secret and illegal censorship orders against US social media platforms, threatening them with million-dollar fines or expulsion from the Brazilian market. In his letter, Trump instructed the US trade representative to open an investigation into Brazil for alleged unfair trade practices in digital commerce.
He is pressuring the country to change its policies and regulations in line with what US big tech wants, such as the review of platform accountability decided by the STF on 25 June, the proposed regulation of AI, and rules on algorithmic transparency and copyright.
The bottom line is that the American tech sector is now the most dynamic and profitable branch of US industry. Unlike sectors such as the automotive industry, which has been stagnant for years, giant technology companies have been producing fabulous profits and have been a source of hope and greed for the American bourgeoisie.
Despite having come into conflict with their representatives (Google, Meta, X [formerly Twitter], among others) during the 2024 election, Trump has now not only reconciled with them, but is also intervening in Brazil on their behalf and in their interests.
The opposition of Trump and the tech giants to any restrictive legislation is due to the fact that holding companies accountable and imposing minimum regulations would mean a reduction in the rate of profit of their operations and, therefore, in how much value the US bourgeoisie can extract from the Brazilian working class.
When Trump and big tech talk about ‘free speech,’ they are actually seeking to protect their profits and private interests at the cost of digital environment that is riddled with dangerous, hidden influences and which is conducive to all kinds of abjectly criminal actions without accountability for their perpetrators and accomplices.
It is also worth mentioning that this controversy aims to restrict the entry of Chinese technology companies into the Brazilian market. This is the same approach adopted by both Biden and Trump in his first term. Both sought to block Huawei from operating in the US and in various parts of the world, including Brazil.
As already pointed out in this article, Chinese imperialist capital has already clearly shown its desire to advance in this sector in Brazil, in the form, for example, of the PowerChina data centre planned for Lages and ‘Peixe Urbano’, controlled by Baidu, the ‘Chinese Google’.
Government reactions
On 15 July, Brazil enacted the Economic Reciprocity Law, enabling the government to implement retaliatory measures against Trump’s tariffs. On August 1, the US’s 50 percent tariffs on most Brazilian products came into effect.
The Chinese reaction was swift: Beijing declared ‘unrestricted support’ for Brazil in the face of Trump’s tariffs, promising to expand purchases of Brazilian commodities and open new lines of credit in RMB for national companies. At the same time, it reinforced its narrative that Brazil and China should stand together against American ‘hegemony.’
One of China’s practical measures to support Brazil in the face of escalating American aggression was to exempt and facilitate trade. In the case of Brazilian coffee, China accredited 183 Brazilian producers as coffee exporters, waiving their fees for the next five years to facilitate access to the Chinese market. In addition, the Beijing government has relaxed the rules for purchasing Brazilian aircraft from Embraer, with China showing interest in expanding this operation.
Another Chinese gesture was the announcement in August of an electric and hybrid car factory for Chinese automaker GWM in Iracemápolis (SP). The planned investment of R$10 billion over seven years is expected to generate around 10,000 direct and indirect jobs.
In addition to promising to strengthen the BRICS, China has also committed to promoting the opening up of the Chinese market to more Brazilian industrial products. To this end, it invited the Brazilian government to invest in marketing initiatives in China that target consumers interested in Brazilian goods. Obviously, the more committed Brazil becomes to China as a market, the greater Brazil’s submission to Chinese capital will be.
Domestically, the Lula government sought to capitalise politically on the conflict. However, it chose not to retaliate using the Economic Reciprocity Law. The approach it adopted was, on the one hand, to denounce the arbitrariness of Trump’s actions and the sell-out nature of his supporters in Brazil, as well as to insist on the need for the US to negotiate on fair and reasonable terms with Brazil.
In addition, on 13 August, the government announced a R$30 billion (approximately US$5.5 billion) relief package through the Export Guarantee Fund. It also guaranteed another R$4.5 billion in support for small businesses. The plan includes tax exemptions and measures to stimulate domestic consumption. The measures were adopted by decree, which allows them to take effect immediately.
Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) and the left-wing parties of the governing coalition, for their part, presented themselves as defenders of national sovereignty, even though the reality is one of submission to foreign capital, whether American or Chinese. Trade unions called for symbolic acts against Trump, but without organising any real strike action that could mobilise the working class independently.
Despite this, a survey conducted between 11 and 13 August shows that Lula’s popularity has risen, while internal political support for the government has grown in the face of Trump’s actions. A complex situation is unfolding. Brazil is not giving in to Trump’s blackmail. The government is increasing its submission to an imperialist rival of the US and is adopting capitalist measures to save the capitalists. Meanwhile, the left and the trade unions limit themselves to supporting the government’s measures and do not present a programme that arms the workers in the face of this situation.
A discredited system
Also in July, the US sanctioned Federal Supreme Court (STF) Minister Alexandre de Moraes under the Magnitsky Act. This meant that the minister had his assets frozen in the US, his visas were revoked, and a ‘national emergency’ was declared, allowing the US to impose additional tariffs as political retaliation.
The Brazilian bourgeoisie, for its part, responded pragmatically. Estadão and other major media outlets quickly aligned their coverage to denounce Trump and criticise his Brazilian supporters, such as the governor of São Paulo. At the same time, they extolled the need for ‘moderation’ and negotiations with Washington.
For this class, it is not in their interest to break with the US, but rather to ensure the minimum stability for their businesses. Hence, the staunch defence of institutions: not because of any democratic principle, but because their predictability and stability allow for better profit margins.
This is why sectors of the bourgeoisie are so supportive of Alexandre de Moraes: not necessarily because of political affinity, but because his actions guarantee legal order, which is good for business, even if this means political arbitrariness.
The backdrop to this dispute is a political system in ruins. After almost two decades of austerity policies, from President Dilma’s first government to President Temer’s spending cap and Lula and Haddad’s ‘fiscal framework’, the working masses have seen only a deepening of their precarity.
Deteriorating public services, inflation that erodes wages, and structural unemployment are undermining the legitimacy of the already bankrupt New Republic. With each crisis, the ruling institutions lose even more credibility.
When the judiciary launches a selective hunt against the far right, as in the case of Bolsonaro, it may temporarily quench Bolsonarism. But at the same time, it reinforces the perception that this is a regime manipulated from above.
For the masses, this perception is increasingly discrediting not only the right but all institutions of the prevailing order. All of this sets the stage for an even more explosive political situation and an increasing radicalisation of broad sectors of society. This tends to be expressed electorally with swings to the right and left.
No confidence in Chinese imperialism
In the face of American aggression, the Lula government and its base present China as Brazil’s ‘strategic ally’. But it must be made clear: Chinese imperialism is no friend of the Brazilian people. China, as an imperialist power, seeks only to increase its profits and secure markets for its surplus capital.
The idea of a ‘multipolar world’ sounds seductive, but it only means the multiplication of imperialist ‘poles’ that exploit the wealth produced by workers. The fallacy of the ‘united Global South’ falls apart when one observes the conditions imposed by Chinese capital in Africa, where loans have turned into unpayable debts, and in Asia, where New Silk Road projects have subjected entire countries to dependency.
For the Brazilian proletariat, replacing American domination with Chinese domination is not emancipation, but merely a change of masters. The case of the BYD factory in Camaçari is exemplary: it presents itself as a symbol of reindustrialisation, but imposes intensive working conditions and seeks to relax labour legislation.
In December 2024, a task force composed of various public agencies rescued 163 Chinese workers who had been displaced to Camaçari to work in ‘slave-like conditions’ at the BYD factory construction site.
The workers were housed in unsanitary conditions, without mattresses, with their belongings stored together with food, under armed surveillance, with exhausting working hours and no weekly days of rest. They were brought in on visas for specialised services, but performed tasks other than those specified. In addition, their passports were retained by their employers, and they were forced to sign contracts with illegal clauses.
The BYD case in Camaçari illustrates some characteristics of Chinese imperialism. Other imperialisms traditionally employ the workforce of the country where they settle and adapt to regional norms. Chinese capitalists do not just export their capital. Sometimes they also export managers, supervisory staff, and technical teams.
In this case, they exported the Chinese workers responsible for assembling the factories and subjected them to the overexploitation and slave-like conditions they are accustomed to applying in China. Their intention was to accelerate the installation of Chinese capital in Camaçari as much as possible and, as soon as possible, begin production and sale of BYD vehicles.
It is, therefore, capital that is as parasitic as American, German, French, Japanese or Korean capital. In some cases, it is even more so. In addition, it seeks to establish its competitiveness by implementing in Brazil the same regime of exploitation to which it subjects the proletariat in China.
Chinese-style capitalism
As more and more imperialist capital penetrates Brazil, we can expect greater pressure to tighten labour legislation and worsen working conditions. Instead of favouring the fight against the 6×1 shift, the situation tends to be one of pressure to adopt the Chinese 996 shift.
This schedule was the norm in China until 2021, when workers worked from 9am to 9pm, six days a week. It is a worse version of the 6×1 (six days on, one day off) schedule, with 12 hours of work per day and 72 hours per week.
This form of work led to a wave of deaths from exhaustion and suicide among workers in the technology sector. After a huge backlash and mobilisation of workers, this working day was officially banned. However, it continues to be practised across China.
In addition, as a way to compete with Chinese companies, American companies are now adopting the same schedule. They seek to disguise this form of greater exploitation of workers with ideological arguments of ‘commitment,’ ‘culture of ambition,’ or ‘start-up spirit.’ But the recipe is the same.
The same is true in other sectors dominated by Chinese capital, where reports of overexploitation, abusive outsourcing, and even practices analogous to slave labour are proliferating. These are not exceptions: it is the standard of Chinese-style capitalism, which combines high technology with brutality in labour relations.
National sovereignty and its historical agent
On 1 August, demonstrations took place in several cities, such as São Paulo and Brasília, with the burning of effigies of Trump and Bolsonaro and slogans in defence of Brazilian sovereignty. Despite the immobility of the left-wing parties and union leaders, a vanguard took to the streets to express a genuine anti-imperialist sentiment.
At the table of every proletarian family, in workplaces and places of study, workers and young people debate Trump’s imperialist aggression. Opinion polls favourable to the Lula government are further evidence of this.
It is necessary to understand the mood of sympathy among the masses for Lula in his confrontation with Trump. One task for communists in this situation is, on the basis of this expression of anti-imperialist sentiment, to patiently explain the dangers of Lula’s position. To show workers that relying on a nascent Chinese imperialism, although more vigorous, dynamic and less tainted than the American one, will strengthen this new master. Preparing a new period of domination and maintaining Brazil’s only formal independence.
It therefore remains to be seen how Brazil can achieve genuine national sovereignty. It is clear to increasingly broad sectors of the masses that the supporters of Bolsonaro are in fact sell-outs, who put their own petty and particular interests before those of the nation. They are appearing publicly and clearly for what they are: agents of US imperialist big business operating in Brazil.
Lula and the government are enjoying a certain sympathy from the masses for not submitting to Trump’s interference in the country. However, it is clear from the analysis presented that Lula’s government is doing nothing more than changing the imperialism to which it will bow. Far from defending national sovereignty, Lula’s policy keeps Brazil in the condition of a dominated and semi-colonial country, only now more inclined to bow to Xi Jinping than to Donald Trump.
Given this scenario, the conclusion is unequivocal: no sector of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, whether allied with American imperialism or associated with Chinese imperialism, is capable of defending national sovereignty. The proletariat can expect no benefit from American imperialism, Chinese imperialism, or its own cowardly and treacherous bourgeoisie.
Therefore, the only historical subject capable of guaranteeing Brazil’s real independence is the proletariat. National sovereignty requires expelling all imperialisms from the country, including both American and Chinese.
To ensure its success, workers will necessarily have to take control of the nation’s economy, place it under their collective control, and organise production according to democratic planning that corresponds to the current needs of the Brazilian people.
Such a regime, which would put the working class at the head of the entire nation, would face fierce opposition from imperialists across the globe. Therefore, the struggle for socialism in Brazil cannot be dissociated from the struggle against capitalism worldwide and would only be a first step in this journey of struggle. The allies of the proletariat, of the rural and urban poor of Brazil, are the workers and peasants of the world, including those of the United States and China.
Only the working class, organised in its own party, armed with the theory of communism and willing to break with the bourgeois order, can lead the country to true sovereignty through a socialist revolution. It is to help the proletariat accomplish these historic tasks that revolutionary communists carry out their militant activity.
Against Trump and Xi Jinping, only the working class, acting independently of the bourgeoisie and imperialism, fighting for the abolition of capitalism, can guarantee sovereignty and emancipation.
